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Abstract
In 1686 in his Discours de me´taphysique, Leibniz points out that
if an arbitrarily complex theory is permitted then the notion of “the-
ory” becomes vacuous because there is always a theory. This idea
is developed in the modern theory of algorithmic information, which
deals with the size of computer programs and provides a new view of
Go¨del’s work on incompleteness and Turing’s work on uncomputabil-
ity. Of particular interest is the halting probability Ω, whose bits
are irreducible, i.e., maximally unknowable mathematical facts. More
generally, these ideas constitute a kind of “digital philosophy” related
to recent attempts of Edward Fredkin, Stephen Wolfram and others to
view the world as a giant computer. There are also connections with
recent “digital physics” speculations that the universe might actually
be discrete, not continuous. This syste`me du monde is presented as a
coherent whole in my book Meta Math!, which will be published this
fall.
Introduction
I am happy to be here with you enjoying the delicate Scandinavian summer; if
we were a little farther north there wouldn’t be any darkness at all. And I am
especially delighted to be here delivering the Alan Turing Lecture. Turing’s
∗Alan Turing Lecture on Computing and Philosophy, E-CAP’05, European Computing
and Philosophy Conference, Ma¨lardalen University, Va¨ster˚as, Sweden, June 2005.
†IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, P. O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598,
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famous 1936 paper is an intellectual milestone that seems larger and more
important with every passing year.1
People are not merely content to enjoy the beautiful summers in the far
north, they also want and need to understand, and so they create myths.
In this part of the world those myths involve Thor and Odin and the other
Norse gods. In this talk, I’m going to present another myth, what the French
call a syste`me du monde, a system of the world, a speculative metaphysics
based on information and the computer.2
The previous century had logical positivism and all that emphasis on the
philosophy of language, and completely shunned speculative metaphysics,
but a number of us think that it is time to start again. There is an emerging
digital philosophy and digital physics, a new metaphysics associated with
names like Edward Fredkin and Stephen Wolfram and a handful of like-
minded individuals, among whom I include myself. As far as I know the terms
“digital philosophy” and “digital physics” were actually invented by Fredkin,
and he has a large website with his papers and a draft of a book about this.
Stephen Wolfram attracted a great deal of attention to the movement and
stirred up quite a bit of controversy with his very large and idiosyncratic
book on A New Kind of Science.
And I have my own book on the subject, in which I’ve attempted to
wrap everything I know and care about into a single package. It’s a small
book, and amazingly enough it’s going to be published by a major New York
publisher a few months from now. This talk will be an overview of my book,
which presents my own personal version of “digital philosophy,” since each
of us who works in this area has a different vision of this tentative, emerging
world view. My book is calledMeta Math!, which may not seem like a serious
title, but it’s actually a book intended for my professional colleagues as well
as for the general public, the high-level, intellectual, thinking public.
“Digital philosophy” is actually a neo-Pythagorean vision of the world,
it’s just a new version of that. According to Pythagoras, all is number — and
by number he means the positive integers, 1, 2, 3, . . . — and God is a math-
1For Turing’s original paper, with commentary, see Copeland’s The Essential Turing.
2One reader’s reaction (GDC): “Grand unified theories may be like myths, but surely
there is a difference between scientific theory and any other narrative?” I would argue
that a scientific narrative is more successful than the Norse myths because it explains
what it explains more precisely and without having to postulate new gods all the time,
i.e., it’s a better “compression” (which will be my main point in this lecture; that’s how
you measure how successful a theory is).
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ematician. “Digital philosophy” updates this as follows: Now everything is
made out of 0/1 bits, everything is digital software, and God is a computer
programmer, not a mathematician! It will be interesting to see how well
this vision of the world succeeds, and just how much of our experience and
theorizing can be included or shoe-horned within this new viewpoint.3
Let me return now to Turing’s famous 1936 paper. This paper is usu-
ally remembered for inventing the programmable digital computer via a
mathematical model, the Turing machine, and for discovering the extremely
fundamental halting problem. Actually Turing’s paper is called “On com-
putable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” and
by computable numbers Turing means “real” numbers, numbers like e or
π = 3.1415926 . . . that are measured with infinite precision, and that can be
computed with arbitrarily high precision, digit by digit without ever stop-
ping, on a computer.
Why do I think that Turing’s paper “On computable numbers” is so
important? Well, in my opinion it’s a paper on epistemology, because we only
understand something if we can program it, as I will explain in more detail
later. And it’s a paper on physics, because what we can actually compute
depends on the laws of physics in our particular universe and distinguishes it
from other possible universes. And it’s a paper on ontology, because it shows
that some real numbers are uncomputable, which I shall argue calls into
question their very existence, their mathematical and physical existence.4
To show how strange uncomputable real numbers can be, let me give a
3Of course, a system of the world can only work by omitting everything that doesn’t
fit within its vision. The question is how much will fail to fit, and conversely, how many
things will this vision be able to help us to understand. Remember, if one is wearing rose
colored glasses, everything seems pink. And as Picasso said, theories are lies that help us
to see the truth. No theory is perfect, and it will be interesting to see how far this digital
vision of the world will be able to go.
4You might exclaim (GDC), “You can’t be saying that before Turing and the computer
no one understood anything; that can’t be right!” My response to this is that before
Turing (and my theory) people could understand things, but they couldn’t measure
how well they understood them. Now you can measure that, in terms of the degree of
compression that is achieved. I will explain this later at the beginning of the section on
computer epistemology. Furthermore, programming something forces you to understand
it better, it forces you to really understand it, since you are explaining it to a machine.
That’s sort of what happens when a student or a small child asks you what at first you
take to be a stupid question, and then you realize that this question has in fact done you
the favor of forcing you to formulate your ideas more clearly and perhaps even question
some of your tacit assumptions.
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particularly illuminating example of one, which actually preceded Turing’s
1936 paper. It’s a very strange number that was invented in a 1927 pa-
per by the French mathematician Emile Borel. Borel’s number is sort of
an anticipation, a partial anticipation, of Turing’s 1936 paper, but that’s
only something that one can realize in retrospect. Borel presages Turing,
which does not in any way lessen Turing’s important contribution that so
dramatically and sharply clarified all these vague ideas.5
Borel was interested in “constructive” mathematics, in what you can
actually compute we would say nowadays. And he came up with an extremely
strange non-constructive real number. You list all possible yes/no questions
in French in an immense, an infinite list of all possibilities. This will be
what mathematicians call a denumerable or a countable infinity of questions,
because it can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the list of positive
integers 1, 2, 3, . . . In other words, there will be a first question, a second
question, a third question, and in general an Nth question.
You can imagine all the possible questions to be ordered by size, and
within questions of the same size, in alphabetical order. More precisely, you
consider all possible strings, all possible finite sequences of symbols in the
French alphabet, including the blank so that you get words, and the period
so that you have sentences. And you imagine filtering out all the garbage
and being left only with grammatical yes/no questions in French. Later I will
tell you in more detail how to actually do this. Anyway, for now imagine
doing this, and so there will be a first question, a second question, an Nth
question.
And the Nth digit or the Nth bit after the decimal point of Borel’s
number answers the Nth question: It will be a 0 if the answer is no, and
it’ll be a 1 if the answer is yes. So the binary expansion of Borel’s number
contains the answer to every possible yes/no question! It’s like having an
oracle, a Delphic oracle that will answer every yes/no question!
How is this possible?! Well, according to Borel, it isn’t really possible,
this can’t be, it’s totally unbelievable. This number is only a mathematical
fantasy, it’s not for real, it cannot claim a legitimate place in our ontology.
Later I’ll show you a modern version of Borel’s number, my halting proba-
bility Ω. And I’ll tell you why some contemporary physicists, real physicists,
not mavericks, are moving in the direction of digital physics.
5I learnt of Borel’s number by reading Tasic’sMathematics and the Roots of Postmodern
Thought, which also deals with many of the issues discussed here.
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[Actually, to make Borel’s number as real as possible, you have to avoid the
problem of filtering out all the yes/no questions. And you have to use decimal
digits, you can’t use binary digits. You number all the possible finite strings of
French symbols including blanks and periods, which is quite easy to do using a
computer. Then the Nth digit of Borel’s number is 0 if the Nth string of characters
in French is ungrammatical and not proper French, it’s 1 if it’s grammatical, but
not a yes/no question, it’s 2 if it’s a yes/no question that cannot be answered (e.g.,
“Is the answer to this question ‘no’?”), it’s 3 if the answer is no, and it’s 4 if the
answer is yes.]
Geometrically a real number is the most straightforward thing in the
world, it’s just a point on a line. That’s quite natural and intuitive. But
arithmetically, that’s another matter. The situation is quite different. From
an arithmetical point of view reals are extremely problematical, they are
fraught with difficulties!
Before discussing my Ω number, I want to return to the fundamental
question of what does it mean to understand. How do we explain or com-
prehend something? What is a theory? How can we tell whether or not
it’s a successful theory? How can we measure how successful it is? Well,
using the ideas of information and computation, that’s not difficult to do,
and the central idea can even be traced back to Leibniz’s 1686 Discours de
me´taphysique.
Computer Epistemology: What is a mathe-
matical or scientific theory? How can we judge
whether it works or not?
In Sections V and VI of his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz asserts that
God simultaneously maximizes the variety, diversity and richness of the
world, and minimizes the conceptual complexity of the set of ideas that
determine the world. And he points out that for any finite set of points there
is always a mathematical equation that goes through them, in other words, a
law that determines their positions. But if the points are chosen at random,
that equation will be extremely complex.
This theme is taken up again in 1932 by Hermann Weyl in his book The
Open World consisting of three lectures he gave at Yale University on the
metaphysics of modern science. Weyl formulates Leibniz’s crucial idea in
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the following extremely dramatic fashion: If one permits arbitrarily complex
laws, then the concept of law becomes vacuous, because there is always a
law! Then Weyl asks, how can we make more precise the distinction between
mathematical simplicity and mathematical complexity? It seems to be very
hard to do that. How can we measure this important parameter, without
which it is impossible to distinguish between a successful theory and one that
is completely unsuccessful?
This problem is taken up and I think satisfactorily resolved in the new
mathematical theory I call algorithmic information theory. The epistemolog-
ical model that is central to this theory is that a scientific or mathematical
theory is a computer program for calculating the facts, and the smaller the
program, the better. The complexity of your theory, of your law, is measured
in bits of software:
program (bit string) −→ Computer −→ output (bit string)
theory −→ Computer −→ mathematical or scientific facts
Understanding is compression!
Now Leibniz’s crucial observation can be formulated much more precisely.
For any finite set of scientific or mathematical facts, there is always a the-
ory that is exactly as complicated, exactly the same size in bits, as the facts
themselves. (It just directly outputs them “as is,” without doing any compu-
tation.) But that doesn’t count, that doesn’t enable us to distinguish between
what can be comprehended and what cannot, because there is always a the-
ory that is as complicated as what it explains. A theory, an explanation,
is only successful to the extent to which it compresses the number of bits
in the facts into a much smaller number of bits of theory. Understanding
is compression, comprehension is compression! That’s how we can tell the
difference between real theories and ad hoc theories.6
What can we do with this idea that an explanation has to be simpler
than what it explains? Well, the most important application of these ideas
that I have been able to find is in metamathematics, it’s in discussing what
mathematics can or cannot achieve. You simultaneously get an information-
theoretic, computational perspective on Go¨del’s famous 1931 incompleteness
6By the way, Leibniz also mentions complexity in Section 7 of his Principles of Nature
and Grace, where he asks the amazing question, “Why is there something rather than
nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than something.”
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theorem, and on Turing’s famous 1936 halting problem. How?7
Here’s how! These are my two favorite information-theoretic incomplete-
ness results:
• You need an N -bit theory in order to be able to prove that a specific
N -bit program is “elegant.”
• You need an N -bit theory in order to be able to determine N bits of
the numerical value, of the base-two binary expansion, of the halting
probability Ω.
Let me explain.
What is an elegant program? It’s a program with the property that
no program written in the same programming language that produces the
same output is smaller than it is. In other words, an elegant program is the
most concise, the simplest, the best theory for its output. And there are
infinitely many such programs, they can be arbitrarily big, because for any
computational task there has to be at least one elegant program. (There may
be several if there are ties, if there are several programs for the same output
that have exactly the minimum possible number of bits.)
And what is the halting probability Ω? Well, it’s defined to be the prob-
ability that a computer program generated at random, by choosing each of
its bits using an independent toss of a fair coin, will eventually halt. Turing
is interested in whether or not individual programs halt. I am interested in
trying to prove what are the bits, what is the numerical value, of the halting
probability Ω. By the way, the value of Ω depends on your particular choice
of programming language, which I don’t have time to discuss now. Ω is also
equal to the result of summing 1/2 raised to powers which are the size in bits
of every program that halts. In other words, each K-bit program that halts
contributes 1/2K to Ω.
And what precisely do I mean by an N -bit mathematical theory? Well,
I’m thinking of formal axiomatic theories, which are formulated using sym-
bolic logic, not in any natural, human language. In such theories there are
always a finite number of axioms and there are explicit rules for mechani-
cally deducing consequences of the axioms, which are called theorems. An
N -bit theory is one for which there is an N -bit program for systematically
7For an insightful treatment of Go¨del as a philosopher, see Rebecca Goldstein’s Incom-
pleteness.
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running through the tree of all possible proofs deducing all the consequences
of the axioms, which are all the theorems in your formal theory. This is slow
work, but in principle it can be done mechanically, that’s what counts. David
Hilbert believed that there had to be a single formal axiomatic theory for all
of mathematics; that’s just another way of stating that math is static and
perfect and provides absolute truth.
Not only is this impossible, not only is Hilbert’s dream impossible to
achieve, but there are in fact an infinity of irreducible mathematical truths,
mathematical truths for which essentially the only way to prove them is to
add them as new axioms. My first example of such truths was determining
elegant programs, and an even better example is provided by the bits of Ω.
The bits of Ω are mathematical facts that are true for no reason (no reason
simpler than themselves), and thus violate Leibniz’s principle of sufficient
reason, which states that if anything is true it has to be true for a reason.
In math the reason that something is true is called its proof. Why are
the bits of Ω true for no reason, why can’t you prove what their values
are? Because, as Leibniz himself points out in Sections 33 to 35 of The
Monadology, the essence of the notion of proof is that you prove a complicated
assertion by analyzing it, by breaking it down until you reduce its truth to
the truth of assertions that are so simple that they no longer require any
proof (self-evident axioms). But if you cannot deduce the truth of something
from any principle simpler than itself, then proofs become useless, because
anything can be proven from principles that are equally complicated, e.g.,
by directly adding it as a new axiom without any proof. And this is exactly
what happens with the bits of Ω.
In other words, the normal, Hilbertian view of math is that all
of mathematical truth, an infinite number of truths, can be com-
pressed into a finite number of axioms. But there are an infinity
of mathematical truths that cannot be compressed at all, not one
bit!
This is an amazing result, and I think that it has to have profound philo-
sophical and practical implications. Let me try to tell you why.
On the one hand, it suggests that pure math is more like biology than
it is like physics. In biology we deal with very complicated organisms and
mechanisms, but in physics it is normally assumed that there has to be a
theory of everything, a simple set of equations that would fit on a T-shirt
and in principle explains the world, at least the physical world. But we have
seen that the world of mathematical ideas has infinite complexity, it cannot
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be explained with any theory having a finite number of bits, which from a
sufficiently abstract point of view seems much more like biology, the domain
of the complex, than like physics, where simple equations reign supreme.
On the other hand, this amazing result suggests that even though math
and physics are different, they may not be as different as most people think!
I mean this in the following sense: In math you organize your computational
experience, your lab is the computer, and in physics you organize physical
experience and have real labs. But in both cases an explanation has to be
simpler than what it explains, and in both cases there are sets of facts that
cannot be explained, that are irreducible. Why? Well, in quantum physics
it is assumed that there are phenomena that when measured are equally
likely to give either of two answers (e.g., spin up, spin down) and that are
inherently unpredictable and irreducible. And in pure math we have a similar
example, which is provided by the individual bits in the binary expansion of
the numerical value of the halting probability Ω.
This suggests to me a quasi-empirical view of math, in which one is more
willing to add new axioms that are not at all self-evident but that are justified
pragmatically, i.e., by their fruitful consequences, just like a physicist would.
I have taken the term quasi-empirical from Lakatos. The collection of essays
New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics edited by Tymoczko in my
opinion pushes strongly in the direction of a quasi-empirical view of math,
and it contains an essay by Lakatos proposing the term “quasi-empirical,”
as well as essays of my own and by a number of other people. Many of them
may disagree with me, and I’m sure do, but I repeat, in my opinion all of
these essays justify a quasi-empirical view of math, what I mean by quasi-
empirical, which is somewhat different from what Lakatos originally meant,
but is in quite the same spirit, I think.
In a two-volume work full of important mathematical examples, Borwein,
Bailey and Girgensohn have argued that experimental mathematics is an ex-
tremely valuable research paradigm that should be openly acknowledged and
indeed vigorously embraced. They do not go so far as to suggest that one
should add new axioms whenever they are helpful, without bothering with
proofs, but they are certainly going in that direction and nod approvingly at
my attempts to provide some theoretical justification for their entire enter-
prise by arguing that math and physics are not that different.
In fact, since I began to espouse these heretical views in the early 1970’s,
largely to deaf ears, there have actually been several examples of such new
pragmatically justified, non-self-evident axioms:
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• the P 6= NP hypothesis regarding the time complexity of computa-
tions,
• the axiom of projective determinacy in set theory, and
• increasing reliance on diverse unproved versions of the Riemann hy-
pothesis regarding the distribution of the primes.
So people don’t need to have theoretical justification; they just do whatever
is needed to get the job done. . .
The only problem with this computational and information-theoretic epis-
temology that I’ve just outlined to you is that it’s based on the computer,
and there are uncomputable reals. So what do we do with contemporary
physics which is full of partial differential equations and field theories, all of
which are formulated in terms of real numbers, most of which are in fact
uncomputable, as I’ll now show. Well, it would be good to get rid of all
that and convert to a digital physics. Might this in fact be possible?! I’ll
discuss that too.
Computer Ontology: How real are real num-
bers? What is the world made of?
How did Turing prove that there are uncomputable reals in 1936? He did it
like this. Recall that the possible texts in French are a countable or denu-
merable infinity and can be placed in an infinite list in which there is a first
one, a second one, etc. Now let’s do the same thing with all the possible
computer programs (first you have to choose your programming language).
So there is a first program, a second program, etc. Every computable real
can be calculated digit by digit by some program in this list of all possible
programs. Write the numerical value of that real next to the programs that
calculate it, and cross off the list all the programs that do not calculate an
individual computable real. We have converted a list of programs into a list
of computable reals, and no computable real is missing.
Next discard the integer parts of all these computable reals, and just keep
the decimal expansions. Then put together a new real number by chang-
ing every digit on the diagonal of this list (this is called Cantor’s diagonal
method; it comes from set theory). So your new number’s first digit differs
from the first digit of the first computable real, its second digit differs from
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the second digit of the second computable real, its third digit differs from
the third digit of the third computable real, and so forth and so on. So it
can’t be in the list of all computable reals and it has to be uncomputable.
And that’s Turing’s uncomputable real number!8
Actually, there is a much easier way to see that there are uncomputable
reals by using ideas that go back to Emile Borel (again!). Technically, the
argument that I’ll now present uses what mathematicians callmeasure theory,
which deals with probabilities. So let’s just look at all the real numbers
between 0 and 1. These correspond to points on a line, a line exactly one
unit in length, whose leftmost point is the number 0 and whose rightmost
point is the number 1. The total length of this line segment is of course
exactly one unit. But I will now show you that all the computable reals in
this line segment can be covered using intervals whose total length can be
made as small as desired. In technical terms, the computable reals in the
interval from 0 to 1 are a set of measure zero, they have zero probability.
How do you cover all the computable reals? Well, remember that list
of all the computable reals that we just diagonalized over to get Turing’s
uncomputable real? This time let’s cover the first computable real with an
interval of size ǫ/2, let’s cover the second computable real with an interval of
size ǫ/4, and in general we’ll cover the Nth computable real with an interval
of size ǫ/2N . The total length of all these intervals (which can conceivably
overlap or fall partially outside the unit interval from 0 to 1), is exactly
equal to ǫ, which can be made as small as we wish! In other words, there
are arbitrarily small coverings, and the computable reals are therefore a set
of measure zero, they have zero probability, they constitute an infinitesimal
fraction of all the reals between 0 and 1. So if you pick a real at random
between 0 and 1, with a uniform distribution of probability, it is infinitely
unlikely, though possible, that you will get a computable real!
What disturbing news! Uncomputable reals are not the exception, they
are the majority! How strange!
In fact, the situation is even worse than that. As Emile Borel points
out on page 21 of his final book, Les nombres inaccessibles (1952), without
making any reference to Turing, most individual reals are not even uniquely
specifiable, they cannot even be named or pointed out, no matter how non-
constructively, because of the limitations of human languages, which permit
8Technical Note: Because of synonyms like .345999 . . . = .346000 . . . you should avoid
having any 0 or 9 digits in Turing’s number.
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only a countable infinity of possible texts. The individually accessible or
nameable reals are also a set of measure zero. Most reals are un-nameable,
with probability one! I rediscovered this result of Borel’s on my own in a
slightly different context, in which things can be done a little more rigorously,
which is when one is dealing with a formal axiomatic theory or an artificial
formal language instead of a natural human language. That’s how I present
this idea in Meta Math!.
So if most individual reals will forever escape us, why should we believe in
them?! Well, you will say, because they have a pretty structure and are a nice
theory, a nice game to play, with which I certainly agree, and also because
they have important practical applications, they are needed in physics. Well,
perhaps not! Perhaps physics can give up infinite precision reals! How? Why
should physicists want to do that?
Because it turns out that there are actually many reasons for being skepti-
cal about the reals, in classical physics, in quantum physics, and particularly
in more speculative contemporary efforts to cobble together a theory of black
holes and quantum gravity.
First of all, as my late colleague the physicist Rolf Landauer used to
remind me, no physical measurement has ever achieved more than a small
number of digits of precision, not more than, say, 15 or 20 digits at most, and
such high-precision experiments are rare masterpieces of the experimenter’s
art and not at all easy to achieve.
This is only a practical limitation in classical physics. But in quantum
physics it is a consequence of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and wave-
particle duality (de Broglie). According to quantum theory, the more accu-
rately you try to measure something, the smaller the length scales you are
trying to explore, the higher the energy you need (the formula describing this
involves Planck’s constant). That’s why it is getting more and more expen-
sive to build particle accelerators like the one at CERN and at Fermilab, and
governments are running out of money to fund high-energy physics, leading
to a paucity of new experimental data to inspire theoreticians.
Hopefully new physics will eventually emerge from astronomical obser-
vations of bizarre new astrophysical phenomena, since we have run out of
money here on earth! In fact, currently some of the most interesting physical
speculations involve the thermodynamics of black holes, massive concentra-
tions of matter that seem to be lurking at the hearts of most galaxies. Work
by Stephen Hawking and Jacob Bekenstein on the thermodynamics of black
holes suggests that any physical system can contain only a finite amount of
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information, a finite number of bits whose possible maximum is determined
by what is called the Bekenstein bound. Strangely enough, this bound on
the number of bits grows as the surface area of the physical system, not as
its volume, leading to the so-called “holographic” principle asserting that in
some sense space is actually two-dimensional even though it appears to have
three dimensions!
So perhaps continuity is an illusion, perhaps everything is really discrete.
There is another argument against the continuum if you go down to what
is called the Planck scale. At distances that extremely short our current
physics breaks down because spontaneous fluctuations in the quantum vac-
uum should produce mini-black holes that completely tear spacetime apart.
And that is not at all what we see happening around us. So perhaps distances
that small do not exist.
Inspired by ideas like this, in addition to a priori metaphysical biases
in favor of discreteness, a number of contemporary physicists have proposed
building the world out of discrete information, out of bits. Some names
that come to mind in this connection are John Wheeler, Anton Zeilinger,
Gerard ’t Hooft, Lee Smolin, Seth Lloyd, Paola Zizzi, Jarmo Ma¨kela¨ and
Ted Jacobson, who are real physicists. There is also more speculative work
by a small cadre of cellular automata and computer enthusiasts including
Edward Fredkin and Stephen Wolfram, whom I already mentioned, as well
as Tommaso Toffoli, Norman Margolus, and others.
And there is also an increasing body of highly successful work on quan-
tum computation and quantum information that is not at all speculative,
it is just a fundamental reworking of standard 1920’s quantum mechanics.
Whether or not quantum computers ever become practical, the workers in
this highly popular field have clearly established that it is illuminating to
study sub-atomic quantum systems in terms of how they process qubits of
quantum information and how they perform computation with these qubits.
These notions have shed completely new light on the behavior of quantum
mechanical systems.
Furthermore, when dealing with complex systems such as those that occur
in biology, thinking about information processing is also crucial. As I believe
Seth Lloyd said, the most important thing in understanding a complex sys-
tem is to determine how it represents information and how it processes that
information, i.e., what kinds of computations are performed.
And how about the entire universe, can it be considered to be a computer?
Yes, it certainly can, it is constantly computing its future state from its
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current state, it’s constantly computing its own time-evolution! And as I
believe Tom Toffoli pointed out, actual computers like your PC just hitch a
ride on this universal computation!
So perhaps we are not doing violence to Nature by attempting to force
her into a digital, computational framework. Perhaps she has been flirting
with us, giving us hints all along, that she is really discrete, not continuous,
hints that we choose not to hear, because we are so much in love and don’t
want her to change!
For more on this kind of new physics, see the books by Smolin and von
Baeyer in the bibliography. Several more technical papers on this subject are
also included there.
Conclusion
Let me now wrap this up and try to give you a present to take home, more
precisely, a piece of homework. In extremely abstract terms, I would say
that the problem is, as was emphasized by Ernst Mayr in his book This is
Biology, that the current philosophy of science deals more with physics and
mathematics than it does with biology. But let me try to put this in more
concrete terms and connect it with the spine, with the central thread, of the
ideas in this talk.
To put it bluntly, a closed, static, eternal fixed view of math can no longer
be sustained. As I try to illustrate with examples in my Meta Math! book,
math actually advances by inventing new concepts, by completely changing
the viewpoint. Here I emphasized new axioms, increased complexity, more
information, but what really counts are new ideas, new concepts, new view-
points. And that leads me to the crucial question, crucial for a proper open,
dynamic, time-dependent view of mathematics,
“Where do new mathematical ideas come from?”
I repeat, math does not advance by mindlessly and mechanically grinding
away deducing all the consequences of a fixed set of concepts and axioms,
not at all! It advances with new concepts, new definitions, new perspectives,
through revolutionary change, paradigm shifts, not just by hard work.
In fact, I believe that this is actually the central question in biology as
well as in mathematics, it’s the mystery of creation, of creativity:
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“Where do new mathematical and biological ideas come from?”
“How do they emerge?”
Normally one equates a new biological idea with a new species, but in
fact every time a child is born, that’s actually a new idea incarnating; it’s
reinventing the notion of “human being,” which changes constantly.
I have no idea how to answer this extremely important question; I wish
I could. Maybe you will be able to do it. Just try! You might have to keep
it cooking on a back burner while concentrating on other things, but don’t
give up! All it takes is a new idea! Somebody has to come up with it. Why
not you?9
Appendix: Leibniz and the Law
I am indebted to Professor Ugo Pagallo for explaining to me that Leibniz,
whose ideas and their elaboration were the subject of my talk, is regarded as
just as important in the field of law as he is in the fields of mathematics and
philosophy.
The theme of my lecture was that if a law is arbitrarily complicated,
then it is not a law; this idea was traced via Hermann Weyl back to Leibniz.
In mathematics it leads to my Ω number and the surprising discovery of
9I’m not denying the importance of Darwin’s theory of evolution. But I want much
more than that, I want a profound, extremely general mathematical theory that captures
the essence of what life is and why it evolves. I want a theory that gets to the heart of
the matter. And I suspect that any such theory will necessarily have to shed new light
on mathematical creativity as well. Conversely, a deep theory of mathematical creation
might also cover biological creativity.
A reaction from Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic: “Regarding Darwin and Neo-Darwinism I
agree with you — it is a very good idea to go beyond. In my view there is nothing more
beautiful and convincing than a good mathematical theory. And I do believe that it must
be possible to express those thoughts in a much more general way. . . I believe that it
is a very crucial thing to try to formulate life in terms of computation. Not to say life
is nothing more than a computation. But just to explore how far one can go with that
idea. Computation seems to me a very powerful tool to illuminate many things about the
material world and the material ground for mental phenomena (including creativity). . .
Or would you suggest that creativity is given by God’s will? That it is the very basic
axiom? Isn’t it possible to relate to pure chance? Chance and selection? Wouldn’t it be a
good idea to assume two principles: law and chance, where both are needed to reconstruct
the universe in computational terms? (like chaos and cosmos?)”
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completely lawless regions of mathematics, areas in which there is absolutely
no structure or pattern or way to understand what is happening.
The principle that an arbitrarily complicated law is not a law can also be
interpreted with reference to the legal system. It is not a coincidence that the
words “law” and “proof” and “evidence” are used in jurisprudence as well
as in science and mathematics. In other words, the rule of law is equivalent
to the rule of reason, but if a law is sufficiently complicated, then it can in
fact be completely arbitrary and incomprehensible.
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